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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the mid 1990s, Tennessee began experiencing a boom in the construction of 
assisted living facilities.1  ARC Lifemed, Inc. (“ARC”) was a large company that for 
many years had been a leader in the construction of nursing home facilities in the 
eastern and southeastern regions of the United States.2  ARC wished to enter the 
assisted living facility market, and in 1997, it embarked upon a business plan with the 
ultimate goal of opening forty assisted living facilities.3  By the fall of 1998, ARC had 
twenty assisted living facilities built and in operation.4 
Despite having no prior experience managing assisted living facilities, LifeTrust, 
Inc. (“LifeTrust”), a company created in 1996, owned and operated thirty assisted 
living facilities by the end of 1998.5  LifeTrust began contemplating ways to increase 
the revenues generated by assisted living facilities through means other than merely 
providing residents with room and board.6  Believing that it could obtain increased 
revenues by entering the pharmacy market, LifeTrust began discussions regarding 
entering into “a joint venture with ‘The Pharmacy,’ an institutional pharmacy serving 
skilled nursing facilities and assisted living facilities primarily in Tennessee.”7  Shortly 
thereafter, American Medserve Corporation acquired The Pharmacy, which was 
                                                 
1 See ARC Lifemed, Inc. v. AMC-Tennessee, Inc., No. M2003-02640-COA-R3-CV, 2005 Tenn. App. 
LEXIS 460, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2005).  
2 Id. at *2-3. 
3 Id. at *3. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id.  The Pharmacy, owned and operated by Buddy Stephens, “had profitably concentrated its 
business in the long-term care market.”  Id. 
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renamed AMC-TN.8  In 1997, LifeTrust and AMC-TN entered into a joint venture, 
forming LifeMed, LLC (“LifeMed”)9 as a Delaware limited liability company 
qualified to conduct business in Tennessee.10  LifeMed was established to operate as 
a “pharmacy within a pharmacy,” running its operations out of AMC-TN’s facilities 
and supplying pharmecutical supplies to LifeTrust’s assisted living facilities.11   
ARC learned of LifeTrust’s and AMC-TN’s joint venture in 1997 while 
searching for ways to increase its own revenues.12  ARC had prior experience 
managing a pharmacy in Richmond, Virginia,13 and expressed an interest in joining 
LifeMed as a member of the joint venture.  ARC contributed $300,000 to LifeMed in 
1998 and received a one-third ownership interest.14  According to LifeMed’s 
Management Agreement, AMC-TN would manage the business’s daily operation.15  
As manager, AMC was entitled to a management fee.16  
                                                 
8 Id.  American Medserve Corporation itself was eventually acquired by Omnicare, Inc., “the leading 
institutional pharmacy in the nation.”  Id. at *3-4.  Although ownership of the business changed for a 
second time, the name AMC-TN was retained.  Id. at *4. 
9 Id. at *4.  LifeTrust initially contributed $200,000 to the joint venture in exchange for a forty percent 
ownership share.  Id.  AMC-TN contributed $300,000 to the joint venture and received a sixty percent 
ownership share.  Id. 
10 Id. at *33.  Both the plaintiff’s complaint and AMC-TN’s counter-complaint affirmatively asserted 
that LifeMed was organized under the laws of Delaware.  The Court of Appeals did not question 
these assertions.  Id. at *29, *33. 
11 Id. at *4.  The parties believed that the “pharmacy within a pharmacy” concept would allow 
LifeMed to share overhead costs with AMC-TN and to utilize AMC-TN’s services without causing 
the overcapitalization of LifeMed.  Id.  
12 Id. 
13 Id.  This pharmacy was used to serve ARC’s nursing home facilities.  Id. at *11. 
14 Id. at *4-5.  Half of ARC’s $300,000 investment went to AMC-TN in the form of a distribution.  Id. 
at *5.  Under the Amended and Restated LLC Agreement executed by ARC, LifeTrust, and AMC-
TN, each member could appoint two members of LifeMed’s Board of Directors; no member could 
withdraw capital funds without the approval of all three members; and each member’s capital account 
would be distributed upon termination of the LLC.  Id.  The Agreement further provided that any 
member could withdraw from the venture “and receive a return of its positive capital account 
balance.”  Id. at *5-6. 
15 Id. at *6.  The Management Agreement stated in part that AMC-TN would provide  “management, 
consulting and advisory services to Owner in connection with the operation of the Pharmacy, and 
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Although both ARC and AMC-TN had experience providing pharmaceutical 
services to nursing homes, none of the members had experience providing these 
services to assisted living facilities.17  Though all the members hoped that ARC’s and 
AMC-TN’s experience in the nursing home pharmaceutical market would translate 
easily into the assisted living facility pharmaceutical market, they would soon find 
that this would not be the case.18  AMC-TN, member and managing partner of 
LifeMed, supplied its pre-existing pharmaceutical clients with pharmaceutical 
products separately from supplying those products to LifeMed.19  This practice 
created inventory control problems because the two pharmacies were not physically 
separated until early 2000.20  These inventory control problems, along with an 
overestimation of the market for assisted living facilities, ultimately led to LifeMed’s 
demise.21  On August 15, 2000, all three members agreed to dissolve LifeMed.22  
From that point forward, the members’ relationship deteriorated to the point that, 
on October 12, 2001, LifeTrust, ARC, and LifeMed “brought suit against AMC-
TN,…alleging breach of contract, breach of fiduciary relationship, negligent 
representation and fraudulent misrepresentation.”23  AMC-TN countersued, claiming 
that LifeMed owed it unpaid management fees under the Management Agreement.24  
Relying on expert testimony, the trial court held that AMC-TN was liable to all 
                                                                                                                                     
shall devote such time, expertise, and resources as may be appropriate to properly manage the 
Pharmacy.”  Id. at *7. 
16 Id. at *9.  This management fee was to be “equal to [AMC-TN]’s actual costs incurred in providing 
the services to be performed by [AMC-TN under the Management Agreement], plus ten percent 
(10%).”  Id.  
17 Id. at *11-12. 
18 Id. at *12. 
19 Id. at *15-16. 
20 Id. at *18-19. 
21 Id.  
22 Id. at *23. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at *28-29. 
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plaintiffs on all claims asserted.25  Additionally, the trial court dismissed AMC-TN’s 
counterclaim.26 
On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision in 
part and reversed in part.27  The court noted that the fiduciary duty of a manager-
member of a Tennessee LLC is generally owed to the LLC itself, rather than to the 
LLC’s individual members.28  However, a breach of a fiduciary duty constitutes a 
breach of contract if the actions constituting the breach of duty also constitute 
violations of the provisions of the LLC agreement or the management agreement.29 
II.  FIDUCIARY DUTY AND THE TENNESSEE LLC 
 In McGee v. Best,30 the Tennessee Court of Appeals recognized the principle 
that in Tennessee, “there is no fiduciary duty between, or among, individual 
members of a Limited Liability Corporation.”31  McGee, a founding member and 
employee of an LLC, was terminated from his position as chief manager of the LLC, 
and the remaining LLC members purchased his interest in the LLC pursuant to a 
contractual purchase option.32  McGee brought suit against the remaining members 
of the LLC, claiming that they had violated the LLC’s operating agreement and their 
fiduciary duties to the LLC.33  The Court of Appeals concluded that, based on 
                                                 
25 Id. at *1-2. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at *2. 
28 Id. at *49 (quoting McGee v. Best, 106 S.W.3d 48, 64 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002)). 
29 Id. at *45.  
30 106 S.W.3d 48 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). 
31 Id. at 63. 
32 Id. at 51, 54. 
33 Id. at 55.  Specifically, McGee alleged  
that the defendants violated the Operating Agreement, and the Tennessee Limited 
Liability Act by purporting to terminate him without a meeting or the waiver of a 
meeting…[and] that the defendants breached the agreement and their fiduciary 
duty to the LLC and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by purporting to 
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Tennessee statutory law, members of a Tennessee member-managed LLC have a 
fiduciary duty to “account to the LLC” for any benefit received and to act as trustee of 
any profits the member derives from any transaction to which the other members of 
the LLC did not consent.34  The court found the statutory language important and 
emphasized that courts should not discount the intent of the legislature as expressed 
in the wording of the legislation itself.35  The court dismissed McGee’s cause of 
action for breach of fiduciary duty because it was clear that the legislature intended 
for LLC members to owe a fiduciary duty only to the LLC itself and not to the other 
members.36  
 The rule espoused by the McGee court—that members of a Tennessee LLC 
owe a fiduciary duty to the LLC itself and not to its members—appears to be 
contradicted by the ruling in Anderson v. Wilder.37  Similar to McGee, the plaintiff LLC 
members were expelled from FuturePoint Administrative Services, LLC, by vote of 
the other members.38  The plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that the defendants breached 
the fiduciary duty they owed to the rest of the members.39  Applying principles of 
Tennessee corporation law, the Tennessee Court of Appeals found that members 
                                                                                                                                     
terminate his employment for ‘cause’ when no cause existed and by attempting to 
acquire his membership interest, without having any right to do so.  
Id. 
34 Id. at *63-64 (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-240-102 (2002)) (emphasis added). 
35 McGee, 106 S.W.3d at 64; see also Worrall v. Kroger Co., 545 S.W.2d 736, 738 (Tenn. 1977) 
(providing that “legislative intent or purpose is to be ascertained primarily from the natural and 
ordinary meaning of the language used, when read in the context of the entire statute, without any 
forced or subtle construction to limit or extend the import of the language”); State ex rel. Rector v. 
Wilkes, 436 S.W.2d 425, 427 (Tenn. 1968) (providing that “[t]he prime purpose of statutory 
interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent and all rules of [statutory] 
construction yield to achieve this end”); Mangrum v. Owens, 917 S.W.2d 244, 246 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1995) (providing that “[t]he rule of statutory construction to which all others must yield is that the 
intention of the legislature must prevail”);  Plough, Inc. v. Premier Pneumatics, Inc., 660 S.W.2d 495, 
498 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (providing that “[t]he rule of statutory construction to which all others 
must yield is that the intention of the legislature must prevail”). 
36 McGee v. Best, 106 S.W.3d 48, 64 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). 
37 No. E2003-00460-COA-R3-CV, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 819 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2003). 
38 Id. at *1. 
39 Id. at *2. 
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holding a majority interest in a Tennessee LLC owe fiduciary duties to holders of 
minority interests in the LLC.40  The defendants argued that the court should follow 
McGee and find that members of an LLC owe fiduciary duties only to the LLC and 
not to other LLC members.41  The Anderson court rejected this argument, however, 
distinguishing the McGee case by characterizing it as merely “an employment dispute” 
not involving any “allegation of oppression by a majority shareholder group.”42 
A. ARC Lifemed, Inc. v. AMC-Tennessee, Inc., and the Application of the Fiduciary 
Duty of LLC Members to Other LLC Members  
In ARC Lifemed, Inc. v. AMC-Tennessee, Inc.,43 the Tennessee Court of Appeals 
ruled that AMC-TN owed no fiduciary duty to the other members of LifeMed, LLC, 
thus reversing the ruling of the trial court that such duties existed and were breached 
by AMC-TN.44  The ARC Lifemed court relied heavily on McGee in reaching its 
conclusion.45  The ARC Lifemed court acknowledged the conflict between the McGee 
and Anderson decisions.46  However, the Anderson court’s ruling was limited to those 
                                                 
40 Id. at *8-9.  In so finding, the Tennessee Court of Appeals specifically referenced Nelson v. Martin, 
958 S.W.2d 643 (Tenn. 1997), a Tennessee Supreme Court case cited in the plaintiff’s brief.  Id. at *8.  
In Nelson, the Tennessee Supreme Court stated that in the corporate context, “majority shareholders 
owe a fiduciary duty to minority shareholders.”  Nelson, 958 S.W.2d at 647; see also Mike v. Po Group, 
Inc., 937 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Tenn. 1996) (providing that “Tennessee courts have stated that majority 
shareholders owe a fiduciary duty to minority shareholders”); Nelms v. Weaver, 681 S.W.2d 547, 549 
(Tenn. 1984) (providing that majority stockholders have “a fiduciary relationship” with minority 
stockholders); Dale v. Thomas H. Temple Co., 208 S.W.2d 344, 352 (Tenn. 1948) (providing that a 
“controlling stockholder…owe[s] a fiduciary duty to other stockholder[s]”). 
41 Anderson, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 819, at *16. 
42 Id.  The Anderson court emphasized that the McGee court “noted that ‘this case boils down to a 
rather uncomplicated dispute controlled by the employment contract and the Operating 
Agreement[;]…[t]he only issue involved is whether termination of the employment was for cause.’”  
Id. (quoting McGee v. Best, 106 S.W.3d 48, 67 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002)). 
43 No. M2003-02640-COA-R3-CV, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 460 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2005). 
44 Id. at *54. 
45 See id. at *49-53.  The ARC Lifemed court quoted extensively from McGee and took steps to closely 
associate the case at bar with McGee.  Id. 
46 See id. at *50. 
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situations in which majority shareholders had wronged minority shareholders.47  
Because LifeMed, LLC, had no majority member, the Anderson decision did not 
apply, and the defendant had no fiduciary duty to the other members of the LLC.48  
Instead, the court stated that the case at bar resembled McGee in that it involved 
nothing more than “uncomplicated contractual duties under an operating agreement 
and a management agreement.”49 
III.  INTERNAL AFFAIRS DOCTRINE 
If the ARC Lifemed court’s ruling regarding the duty owed by members of a 
Tennessee LLC to other LLC members were the only, or even the most significant, 
issue implicated, the case, while interesting, would be simply another appellate court 
case upholding Tennessee precedent.  However, the most significant issue implicated 
by the ARC Lifemed case concerns choice of law, an issue not readily apparent to one 
not specifically looking for it.  Couched within the opinion, and seemingly glossed 
over by the appellate court, is the fact that LifeMed, LLC, was organized under 
Delaware law.50  Despite this “key fact,” the Tennessee Court of Appeals adjudicated 
the case based on Tennessee statutory and case law.51 
 ARC Lifemed is not the first case in which a state has attempted to apply its 
own law to entities organized in Delaware.  In VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. 
Examen, Inc.,52 the Delaware Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether a 
California statute53 provided shareholders with rights in addition to those provided 
under Delaware law or whether the California statute preempted Delaware law.54  
                                                 
47 Anderson v. Wilder, No. E2003-00460-COA-R3-CV, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 819, at *8-9 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2003). 
48 ARC Lifemed, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 460, at *50. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at *33. 
51 See, e.g., id. at *47-53. 
52 871 A.2d 1108 (Del. 2005). 
53 The California statute in question was section 2115 of the California Corporations Code, which 
provides that the articles of incorporation of foreign corporations having contacts with California 
must comply with California law, regardless of the foreign corporation’s state of incorporation.  CAL. 
CORP. CODE § 2115(a)-(b) (West 2006). 
54 VantagePoint, 871 A.2d at 1112, 1114 & n.22. 
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Examen provided legal expense management solutions throughout the United 
States.55  Examen was contemplating a merger with LexisNexis, but the merger 
required the approval of a majority of the holders of Examen common stock and 
Series A Preferred stock, voting together as a single class.56  VantagePoint owned 
approximately eighty-three percent Examen’s common stock and wanted a separate 
class vote instead of the two classes voting together as one class because a separate 
vote would have given VantagePoint the power to block the merger.57  VantagePoint 
wanted the California statute to apply because its application would allow a separate 
class vote, whereas the application of Delaware law would not.58 
 Examen filed a complaint in Delaware seeking a declaration that Delaware 
law applied, while VantagePoint filed an action in California seeking “a declaration 
that Examen was a quasi-California corporation…and therefore subject to” 
California’s corporate law statutes.59  The California Superior Court stayed its action 
to allow the Delaware court to rule on Examen’s choice of law action.60  The 
Delaware Court of Chancery held that Delaware law governed, which meant that the 
shareholder vote on the proposed merger of Examen and LexisNexis would entail 
common stock and Series A Preferred Stock voting as a single class.61  VantagePoint 
appealed the decision to the Delaware Supreme Court, which affirmed the Court of 
Chancery.62 
 In ruling that only Delaware law applied in the VantagePoint case, the 
Delaware Supreme Court invoked the internal affairs doctrine.63  Courts have long 
accepted that the only state that should have the authority to regulate a corporation’s 
                                                 
55 Id. at 1110-11. 
56 Id. at 1111. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 1109-10. 
60 Id. at 1110. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 1109. 
63 Id. at 1117-18. 
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internal affairs is the state of  incorporation.64  This principle, known as the “internal 
affairs doctrine,” developed from the notion that in order to prevent corporations 
from being subjected to inconsistent regulations from different states, the authority 
to regulate a corporation’s internal affairs should reside with only one jurisdiction.65  
The internal affairs doctrine protects the expectations of parties with an interest in a 
corporation by providing a sense of certainty and predictability regarding the law that 
will govern the corporation.66  Indeed, the uniform treatment of those associated 
with a business entity is only possible if the laws of a single state govern the entity.67  
Individuals that may be affected by the choice of laws applicable to a business entity 
expect that the laws of the entity’s state of incorporation will govern, as this state is 
easily identified.68  However, the internal affairs doctrine is more than merely a 
conflict of laws principle.  It also protects the right of business entity actors to know 
which laws will govern their and the entity’s actions.69  This right to know which laws 
will apply to a given situation is guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the 
                                                 
64 See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982) (providing that “only one State should have 
the authority to regulate a corporation's internal affairs—matters peculiar to the relationships among 
or between the corporation and its current officers, directors, and shareholders—because otherwise a 
corporation could be faced with conflicting demands”); Rogers v. Guar. Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123, 130 
(1933) (providing that “[i]t has long been settled doctrine that a court—state or federal—sitting in one 
state will, as a general rule, decline to interfere with, or control by injunction or otherwise, the 
management of the internal affairs of a corporation organized under the laws of another state but will 
leave controversies as to such matters to the courts of the state of the domicile”). 
65 See Edgar, 457 U.S. at 645. 
66 See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69, 91 (1987).  The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of 
Laws posits that   
[a]pplication of the local law of the state of incorporation will usually be supported 
by those choice-of-law factors favoring the needs of the interstate…system[ ], 
certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, protection of the justified 
expectations of the parties and ease in the application of the law to be applied. 
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 cmt. e (2005). 
67 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 cmt. e (2005). 
68 Id. 
69 VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1113 (Del. 2005). 
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Fourteenth Amendment.70  The internal affairs doctrine is now a well established 
doctrine that is recognized by both federal and state courts.71 
 In Edgar v. MITE Corp.,72 a Delaware corporation initiated a cash tender offer 
for all of the outstanding shares of an Illinois corporation.73  MITE Corp., the 
offeror, had not registered the offer with the Illinois Secretary of State as required by 
Illinois statute mandating registration of any takeover offer for the shares of an 
Illinois target corporation.74  On the same day that MITE Corp. initiated the tender 
offer, it also commenced litigation to challenge the registration requirement.75  The 
United States Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts’ rulings, finding that the 
Illinois statute in question was “a substantial burden on interstate commerce” and, 
thus,  “invalid under the Commerce Clause.”76  The Illinois Secretary of State raised 
the internal affairs doctrine issue, arguing that because the tender offer occurred in 
Illinois, the Court should apply the internal affairs doctrine and hold that Illinois law 
governs the transaction.77  The United States Supreme Court stated that, because the 
Illinois statute applied not only to transactions involving Illinois corporations but 
also to transactions in which ten percent of the target corporation’s shares are held 
                                                 
70 Id.  The Due Process Clause provides in part that  
[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.  
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
71 See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69, 91 (1987); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 
645 (1982); McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 208-09 (Del. 1987). 
72 475 U.S. 624 (1982). 
73 Id. at 626-27. 
74 Id. at 626-28. 
75 Id. at 628. 
76 Id. at 646. 
77 Id. at 645. 
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by Illinois residents, regardless of the target company’s state of incorporation, the 
internal affairs doctrine could not apply to the statute.78 
In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.,79 Dynamics Corp., which was attempting to 
acquire a significant amount of CTS Corp. stock, challenged the validity of a segment 
of the Indiana Business Corporation Law,80 alleging that the federal Williams Act81 
preempted the Indiana Act.82  The District Court found in favor of Dynamics Corp., 
and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.83  The United States Supreme Court reversed the 
two lower courts, stating that the Williams Act did not preempt the Indiana Act84 
and reiterating that “[i]t…is an accepted part of the business landscape…for States 
to create corporations, to prescribe their powers, and to define the rights that are 
acquired by purchasing their shares.”85  The Court went on to state one of the most 
important rationales underlying the internal affairs doctrine, namely, to “promot[e] 
stable relationships among parties involved in the corporations [a state] charters.”86 
In McDermott Inc. v. Lewis,87 upon which the VantagePoint court relied heavily,88 
the Delaware Supreme Court applied the internal affairs doctrine in deciding that 
                                                 
78 Id.  
79 481 U.S. 69 (1987). 
80 IND. CODE §§ 23-1-17-1 et seq. (2005). 
81 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (2005). 
82 CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 75. 
83 Id. at 76. 
84 Id. at 86.  The Court opined that “[t]he longstanding prevalence of state regulation in this area 
suggests that, if Congress had intended to pre-empt all state laws that delay the acquisition of voting 
control following a tender offer, it would have said so explicitly” and that “[t]he regulatory conditions 
that the [Indiana] Act places on tender offers are consistent with the text and the purposes of the 
Williams Act.”  Id. at 86. 
85 Id. at 91. 
86 Id. 
87 531 A.2d 206 (Del. 1987). 
88 VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1110-16 (Del. 2005). 
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Panamanian law governed a Delaware company’s voting of its shares in a 
Panamanian corporation.89  In McDermott, a Delaware subsidiary of a Panamanian 
corporation wanted to vote its shares in the parent company in a way prohibited by 
Delaware law.90  The plaintiffs filed suit to rescind the reorganization under which 
McDermott Delaware became a subsidiary of McDermott International (the 
Panamanian company).91  The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that 
Panama would not apply its laws to the facts of the case.92  On appeal, the Delaware 
Supreme Court reversed based on the fact that there was no relationship between 
McDermott International and the State of Delaware and because the issues raised by 
the plaintiffs did not involve the internal affairs of McDermott Delaware.93  
Therefore, based on the internal affairs doctrine, Panamanian law applied to the 
manner of voting shares in McDermott International; thus, McDermott Delaware 
was allowed to vote its shares in the parent company in a manner prohibited by 
Delaware law.94 
Quoting from McDermott, the VantagePoint court noted that the application of 
“local internal affairs law…to a foreign corporation is ‘apt to produce inequalities, 
intolerable confusion, and uncertainty, and intrude into the domain of other states 
that have a superior claim to regulate the same subject matter.’”95  To avoid these 
potential problems, the VantagePoint court followed Delaware precedent and applied 
the internal affairs doctrine.96  The internal affairs doctrine was relevant in 
VantagePoint because the controversy being adjudicated clearly involved the 
relationship of a corporation to its shareholders.97  It was this relationship between 
                                                 
89 McDermott Inc., 531 A.2d at 208-09. 
90 Id. at 208.  
91 Id. at 209. 
92 Id. at 209, 212. 
93 Id. at 209. 
94 Id. at 209, 219. 
95 VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1114 (Del. 2005) (quoting 
McDermott, 531 A.2d at 216). 
96 Id. at 1116. 
97 Id. at 1115-16. 
2006] ARC LIFEMED, INC. V. AMC-TENNESSEE, INC. 399 
 
  
the shareholders, some of whom lived in Delaware, and Examen, Inc., a Delaware 
corporation, that demanded that the internal affairs doctrine deem Delaware law 
controlling.98  
Notwithstanding the Tennessee Court of Appeals’ decision in ARC Lifemed, 
in the past, Tennessee courts have applied the internal affairs doctrine.  In Bayberry 
Associates v. Jones,99 the Tennessee Court of Appeals ruled that Maryland corporate 
law applied to litigation involving a Maryland corporation.100  In Bayberry, Comdata 
was a Maryland corporation with its principal place of business in Tennessee.101  
After attempts to negotiate a merger with more than one company, Comdata finally 
reached a tentative agreement to merge with Welch, Carson, Anderson & Stowe IV, 
a New York limited partnership.  Bayberry, a New Jersey limited partnership that 
owned a large amount of Comdata stock, filed a class action suit in Tennessee, 
seeking damages and an injunction to prevent the merger.102  In deciding the case, 
the Tennessee Court of Appeals was first required to determine which state’s law 
would apply.103  The court interpreted the internal affairs doctrine as requiring that 
“[c]laims involving the ‘internal affairs’ of a corporation should be resolved in 
accordance with the law of the state of incorporation.”104  The Court also looked to 
the Tennessee corporation statutes, which contain a provision addressing the internal 
affairs doctrine.105  The court concluded that, by enacting legislation that codifies the 
internal affairs doctrine, the Tennessee legislature “implicitly recognized and 
approved the internal affairs doctrine as a choice of law rule for Tennessee.”106 
                                                 
98 Id. at 1116. 
99 1988 WL 137181 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 1988). 
100 Id. at *4. 
101 Id. at *1. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at *4-5. 
104 Id. at *4. 
105 Id. at *4-5.  The Tennessee Code provides that “[c]hapters 11-27 of this title do not authorize this 
state to regulate the organization or internal affairs of a foreign corporation authorized to transact 
business in this state.”  TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-25-105(c) (2005). 
106 Bayberry, 1988 WL 137181, at *5. 
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IV.  IMPLICATIONS OF ARC LIFEMED V. AMC-TENNESSEE 
Both Tennessee case law and Tennessee statutory law clearly indicate that, 
under the internal affairs doctrine, Tennessee courts should apply the corporate law 
of the state under which a business entity that is a party to litigation is 
incorporated.107  The ARC Lifemed court, however, applied Tennessee LLC law to an 
LLC organized in Delaware.108  The Tennessee Court of Appeals’ failure to apply the 
widely recognized and often-applied internal affairs doctrine is likely due to the fact 
that neither party in the ARC Lifemed case sought the application of Delaware law, as 
the court made no mention of either party raising the choice of law issue.  It is 
possible that both parties’ attorneys examined Delaware law and neither concluded 
that the use of Tennessee law would be disadvantageous or would lead to a result 
different from the result that would be obtained under Delaware law.  In any case, 
attorneys representing business entities in litigation in Tennessee courts should be 
mindful of the state in which the entities they represent are incorporated.  This 
information will allow attorneys to include the choice of law issue implicating the 
internal affairs doctrine in their complaints or answers to complaints, as the case may 
be. 
                                                 
107 See id. at *4-5; § 48-25-105(c). 
108 See ARC Lifemed, Inc. v. AMC-Tennessee, Inc., No. M2003-02640-COA-R3-CV, 2005 Tenn. App. 
LEXIS 460, at *47-53 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2005). 
